Putin forever
- The Unyielding Grip of Putinism: When Will It End?
As the world watches, the desire for the end of the Russian leader's tenure grows. Yet, in the shadows of power, Putinism seems destined to persist – too many continue to reap the rewards of its existence.
By Dr. Dmitri Stratievski, Chairman of the Eastern Europe Centre (OEZB), a Berlin-based think tank.
Putin's Shadow: Uncovering the Hidden Sociopolitical Model Beyond the Spotlight
In the aftermath of the invasion in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin remains the center of public attention. The hope for a better future in Europe is linked to his loss of power. Yet, beneath the surface lies a frequently overlooked reality: Russia's leadership maintains control through more than just pressure and repression. Within the vast expanse of the world's largest country, a new sociopolitical model has taken root, with numerous beneficiaries, capable of functioning and surviving without its creator.
Many Western experts primarily view Putin's system as a tool for consolidating his rule, pointing to the personality cult and the incessant Kremlin message: the current head of state is irreplaceable. Russian top politician Vyacheslav Volodin articulated the guiding principle of his state from the ruling elites' perspective in 2014: "As long as there is Putin, there is Russia. No Putin, no Russia." Observers are equally justified in seeing Putin as a peacemaker and mediator within the Russian power hierarchy, whose final word ensures the stability of the state apparatus. While Putin's role in authoritarian Russia cannot be downplayed, Putinism has evolved to signify more than just a series of supportive measures for a single individual.
Scientific Putinism: A Powerful and Flexible Ideology Shaping Modern Russia
Russian journalist Andrei Kolesnikov, in his latest publication for the banned Carnegie Moscow Center, speaks of "scientific Putinism," drawing a parallel to "scientific communism," the principles of which every Soviet student had to memorize. Although "scientific Putinism" is less dialectical and proves to be extremely ideologically flexible, the comparison is valid. Like the basic conception of the Soviet era, Putinism serves as the foundation for the entire contemporary Russian state, not just for one man or his inner circle. The Putin system acts as a protective mechanism for preserving the "good old days," representing a resurgence of traditionalism and the conditions of the last century, unafraid of violence and violating all behavioral norms, in both foreign policy and domestic affairs.
Putinism creates lawless spaces and plays on people's fears, such as the "enslavement of Russia by NATO," the decline in living standards, or the loss of privileges. This preservation of the current situation, with a few insignificant cosmetic adjustments, consciously or unconsciously appeals to many Russians. Putinism is functional, and that is what makes it strong.
Russia's Fragmented Leadership - Battles for Influence Whilst United in Defending their Shared System
The Russian leadership has never been homogenous. However, war demands a certain discipline, making the struggle for influence and resources less visible. Nevertheless, the powerful in the Kremlin and the provinces are far from marching in lockstep; they fight one another: intelligence agents versus military, oligarchs against oligarchs, governors opposing local FSB chiefs. Despite differing interests, they show a surprising degree of unity in their pursuit to preserve Putinism, the sacred cow of the elite.
In a liberal democracy, today's politicians, top managers of state corporations, bureaucrats at all levels, and Kremlin-aligned economic experts would have no say. Most of them can neither win elections fairly nor prove their legitimacy without corruption. Even the older members of these cliques have forgotten how to navigate a centralized "power vertical" reality. The younger generation, on the other hand, has grown accustomed from an early age to the idea that personal advancement opportunities are primarily linked to good networks and belonging to an influential group. The will of the people and civil society control remain foreign concepts in this context.
Protecting the Regime: Russia's Civil Servants and Police Maintain a Firm Grip on Power
No major changes to the system can occur without the involvement of Russian Tschinowniki (members of the civil service) and the police. In 2020, there was one civil servant for every 60 inhabitants in the Russian Federation, ranking third globally after Belarus and Kazakhstan. This is significantly more than in the Tsarist or Soviet eras. For comparison: the ratio in Germany two years ago was 1:165, in the USA 1:157. In the world list of police officers per 100,000 inhabitants, Russia ranked 25th in 2018 – just after the small island nations. In total, the number of civil servants was estimated at 2.4 million and that of police officers at nearly 800,000. These two groups, being financially well-secured, will prevent any revolution because they would have to pay a high price: the reduction of their total numbers and the perks that come with their jobs. Politics and state-affiliated economy, bureaucracy and Kremlin-loyal science, as well as culture and media landscape, all pursue the goal of preserving Putinism. This is their ticket to a secure future that closely resembles the past.
“Divided We Stand”: The Paradox of High Approval Ratings for Putin and the Impact on Russian Society
High approval ratings for Putin in Russia signal not only support for him personally but also for his system. However, waning support for Putin himself doesn't necessarily imply the end of Putinism. This endorsement of the Putin system isn't a sign of trust, but rather a symbol of mistrust and despair. Russian society remains fragmented.
The exiled opposition newspaper Novaya Gazeta featured an interview with sociologist Grigory Yudin under the headline: "The fragmentation of Russian society is more terrifying than nuclear war." Yudin delivers a scathing verdict: Most people in his homeland think exclusively in terms of their private lives. They aggressively defend their own small worlds, resist any involvement in politics, and shirk responsibility for political affairs. Public matters remain irrelevant to Russians and are delegated to those in power. This atomization of society plays into the hands of the rulers, as collective action is dismissed and deemed unnecessary.
The Shadows of the Past: Why Russians Remain Loyal to the Putinist model
Many people in Russia are still traumatized by the country's recent history. The collapse of the USSR, the painful reforms towards a market economy, and the mass impoverishment of the 1990s shape public consciousness, take root in collective memory, and are passed on to the next generation as a negative example, now accompanied by numerous myths. The Yeltsin era (1991-1999) is the only experience of (incomplete) democracy for the Russian population. "Democracy, Russian-style" is equated in the eyes of millions of "ordinary people" with high crime, disorder, social decline, and the war in Chechnya as a precursor to a possible disintegration of Russia.
Fueled by propaganda, the Kremlin introduced the specter of the "nineties" as a knockout argument against any dissent, as "proof" of the indispensability of its model, and ruthlessly exploited this grievance. A few years after his election as president, Putin made an unwritten agreement on behalf of the state with his people: The people voluntarily give up their freedoms and give the government the green light for their authoritarian style of governance. In return, they receive relative prosperity. For the broad masses in Russia, this pact with the state remains valid, with or without Putin.
Unwavering Course: Russia's Reluctance to Abandon Putinism
Neither the powerful nor the "ordinary folks" in Russia are currently interested in dismantling Putinism completely and pushing for fundamental political reforms. Virtually no one is vehemently demanding this. Only a handful are willing to take the risk of what would undoubtedly be a challenging turning point. Without a doubt, Putin is one of the most significant pillars of his system. On the other hand, Putinism has become so self-sustaining and tightly interwoven with the Russian state that it stands a good chance of survival, even in the absence of its eponymous leader.
In the absence of a compelling ideological alternative, one that resonates with the vast majority of people in Russia, the Putin system remains enduring. The Russian opposition, already small, fractured, and marginalized, is unlikely to pose a serious challenge to Putin's future authoritarian successor. Once Putin vacates his seat in the Kremlin, certain adjustments in domestic and foreign policy will undoubtedly be necessary. However, the hope for a total dismantling of Putinism remains exceedingly slim.
Dr. Dmitri Stratievski's expertise in Eastern European politics and history has made him a sought-after expert by television stations, and the press. His extensive knowledge and insightful analysis have made him a valuable resource for news programs seeking to provide in-depth coverage and understanding of the complex political landscape of Eastern Europe. As the chairman of the Berlin-based think tank Osteuropa-Zentrum Berlin e.V. (Eastern Europe Centre Berlin), Dr. Stratievski is committed to advancing the understanding of the region and fostering constructive dialogue among policymakers, specialist experts, and the broader public. His contributions to the field have made him a respected voice in the media and beyond.
The Pacifist Movement in Germany: For World Peace or for Friendship with Putin?
Dmitri Stratievski on how the splintering of the German Pacifist movement has been exposed by the war in Ukraine
This article was first publishedin: Riddle Russia. Source Link see below.
After the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, a fierce debate began in Germany about how to react. Empathy, solidarity with Ukraine and a fundamental readiness to support it were expressed by all significant German officials; yet the debate around any supply of weapons and options for a peaceful settlement soon became controversial. In this discussion, the focus remains on German pacifists, who are now severely criticized. Some commentators have marked «the end of unconditional pacifism», or speak of its «suicidal tendencies», and predict it a place «in the dustbin of history». Others call for «showing responsibility» and finding a new formula that excludes both the «old pacifism» and militarism.
Evolution of the pacifist movement
The roots of the mass pacifist movement in West Germany (the Friedensbewegung) dates back to the 1950s. The impetus was the debate about the role of West Germany in the context of the Coñd War. The country, according to many, had too hastily joined NATO in 1955, and three years later the Bundestag decided to deploy American nuclear weapons. In all major cities, informal networks of anti-militarists arose, uniting leftists, liberals, intellectuals, church leaders and anti-fascist organizations. Soon enough, Germany’s pacifists became the main socio-political force that advocated a different concept for the development of the Federal Republic. And strengthening that position further was the ban on the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), which had managed to collect almost six million signatures under an appeal against remilitarization. Pacifists also gained ground from the intransigence of the CDU and the extremely cautious position of the SPD.
An activist of those years, writer Hans Werner Richter noted the popularity of the movement under slogans like «Without me!» and «No death in an atomic fire!» He famously said:«Professors, writers, directors, actors, journalists protested. Practically the whole of spiritual Germany protested, in unity, more united than ever before». Major political figures were involved in the orbit of pacifism. Gustav Heinemann, for instance, who resigned as Konrad Adenauer’s Interior Minister in protest against the arms race. The April «Easter Marches» (up to 300,000 participants) were born at around this time too, and remain the main annual rally for German pacifists. It intertwined with student protests in the 1960s, aimed at changing the politics of memory and accepting responsibility for the Nazi crimes of the entire German people. In this way the peace movement — which had established stable international contacts based on resistance to the Vietnam War — was transformed into one of the main driving forces that forever changed the social climate in Germany.
It received partial formalization in the form of the Extra-Parliamentary Opposition (APO), which became the cradle for new parties, primarily the Greens. Protests against the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Western Europe and the development of neutron weapons gave new impetus to German pacifism. Historian Philipp Gassert notes: «The peace movement of the 1980s reached the highest level of protest mobilization in the history of the ‘old FRG’. More people took to the streets than at any time since 1949.» Contrary to popular belief, German pacifism concentrated not only on criticism of Western realities. At the demonstrations and in the speeches of activists, there were (albeit in a much smaller volume) words of protest against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the aggressive policy of the USSR and its satellites, as well as the adoption of ever new types of weapons of mass destruction, both in the West and in the East. In the conditions of the 80s, new topics were added to the traditional anti-war agenda: environmental protection and the rejection of nuclear power plants.
Identity Crisis
The end of the 20th century was a triumph for the German peace movement. The Cold War ended. The US and the USSR signed agreements on radical reductions in nuclear weapons. Germany united, as many pacifists had demanded, and made peacekeeping a diplomatic priority. Environmental issues have become an integral part of the programs of almost all political parties, and the decision to abandon nuclear energy was supported even by conservative forces represented by the CDU during Angela Merkel’s chancellorship. Yet in the 21st century, humanity has not stopped waging war. NATO’s operation against Yugoslavia in 1999 and the US war against Iraq in 2003 caused a temporary surge in the popularity of German pacifists. In February 2003, up to half a million people took to the streets of Berlin. The press called this protest «the largest demonstration for peace in the history of Germany.» Easter marches continued, significant organizations continued to function, the pacifist agenda enjoyed the support of the Germans. But, in general, the pacifists began to lose broad political influence. Quite often, any criticism of NATO and the United States as the world’s leading military power resulted in anti-Americanism. Criticism of Israel’s actions led to dubious alliances with groups close to anti-Semitism that denied freedom and democracy. This stimulated a split in the pacifist movement. Those who protested together in the 1980s, and their children, no longer wanted to stand together at the same demonstration. Extreme views alienated more moderate supporters and splintered cohesion.
Russian war against Ukraine: a stumbling block
February 24, 2022 will undoubtedly go down in the history of German pacifism as the final split within the movement. Russia’s large-scale attack on Ukraine, which from a humanist, anti-fascist and anti-militarist standpoint can only be regarded as an aggression against an independent state, put activists in a difficult situation and divided them. NZZ stated the changed paradigm: «Former pacifists call for the supply of tanks to Ukraine, nationalists protest for peace with Moscow.» While some organizations, such as the Osnabrücker Friedensinitiative, condemned the war in the very first days and called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory, others were unable to publicly express their position, limiting themselves to calling for humanitarian aid to Ukrainians. Some pacifists have tried to stay in their «comfort zone» and condemn not only Russia, but also the West. For example, a rally was held in Chemnitz against «Russia’s aggression and NATO’s imperialist power policy.»
Further events and the protracted nature of the war deepened the contradictions in the ranks of the pacifists. On the one hand, their worldview demanded the cessation of hostilities as such and the condemnation of any war; on the other hand, the international community clearly draws a line between aggressive and defensive war, recognizes the right of states and peoples to self-defense and a liberation of the occupied regions. This dissonance marked three groups of pacifists in their attitude to the present war. An absolute minority focused on criticizing the aggressive actions of the Kremlin and calling for the withdrawal of Russian troops does not directly condemn the supply of weapons to Ukraine and does not call for an immediate cessation of hostilities. They are aware of the need to de-occupy Ukrainian territories but are unwilling to «openly endorse the war.» The significant left-wing publication Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, traditionally close to pacifist circles, provides a platform for critical articles against the German peace movement, the authors of which do not avoid sharp formulations: «This had and has nothing to do with the noble idea of pacifism (…). The intention of pacifism has never been to preemptively throw the white flag at the aggressor and also turn the other cheek, but rather to permanently ban aggressive wars, an indisputable state practice until the 19th century. To fight back with the use of force of arms if necessary has never been «bellicism».
The second group, one way or another, tries to remove all or part of the blame from Russia, presenting it almost as a «victim of Western aggression» or, at least, «only an accomplice», but by no means the only culprit of the current bloodshed. Classical examples of such forces are a number of politicians from the Left Party, as well as Bundestag deputy from this party Sarah Wagenknecht and journalist Alisa Schwarzer. Both activists, previously unnoticed in the peace movement (the media ironically called them «new pacifists»), are now the «loudest» speakers of «Russlandversteher.» Wagenknecht sees NATO expansion as «the reason for the current war» and believes that Putin only wants to «prevent Ukraine from becoming an external outpost of NATO.» Schwarzer, habitually listing the «sins» of the United States, recognizes «America’s responsibility for the war.»
Pro-Russian, far-left and far-right activists adjoin this group. The leaders of the «understanding Russia» from among the pacifists are trying to dissociate themselves from the «undesirable» allies, but from time to time the corresponding symbols appear at the demonstrations «for peace». The organizers of the «Easter March» in 2023, even at the preparation stage, faced polarity of opinions even among regular participants. Internet forums have raised questions about why the organizers do not condemn Putin’s imperialism harshly enough, want to leave Ukraine in trouble, do not plan to cooperate with Ukrainians in Germany, and do not display Ukrainian symbols. They remained unanswered. Tagesschau quotes a Left Party member’s confession of a «crack in the peace movement» and at the same time quotes one of the march’s coordinators as saving: «You can’t put all the blame on the Russians alone!»
Finally, the third and most numerous group of pacifists are supporters of an immediate ceasefire and a peace agreement between the warring parties. Over the past 14 months, dozens of appeals and collective petitions of this kind have been published in Germany. They are united by one «inconvenient» fact: the authors, condemning the Kremlin’s aggression and knowing about the positions of the parties, are not able to voice a model, the implementation of which will restore the territorial integrity of Ukraine through diplomacy, save the lives of Ukrainians under occupation, stop the process of forced assimilation and Russification depriving the citizens of Ukraine of their ethno-cultural roots.
German pacifists and Russia
The publication in the Washington Post about Moscow’s attempts to support the anti-Ukrainian agenda in Germany by inciting «anti-war» protests resonated in Germany. Intelligence documents came into the hands of journalists detailing recorded meetings in the Kremlin discussing efforts to stoke the anti-war movement in Europe, with Germany as a priority. According to the authors, the materials do not contain clear information about the channels of communication between Russians and Germans but indicate that at least one activist close to Wagenknecht was in contact with Russian officials at the time the plan was developed. As specific measures, support for demonstrations of the ultra-right and ultra-left was indicated, assistance to the AfD in elections, up to the «victory» of the pro-Russian forces «at all levels», a campaign in Germany to convince the Germans of the «significant harm» of sanctions against Russia for the German economy, discrediting the EU and NATO.
The article did not speak directly about modern pacifists (the publication contained only a comment by an anonymous German official who mentioned attempts to influence the anti-war movement by the Soviet secret services). On top of that, the focus was on Wagenknecht, the AfD and other radicals. Yet many perceived this as a reproach to the fighters for peace as such, accusing them of ties with Russia. There is no doubt Moscow benefits from a broad movement against aid to Ukraine, especially in the military sector. It is also hard not to notice the closely related slogans that the ultra-left and ultra-right come up with. But in the case of the «classic» pacifist circles in Germany, one can rather talk about the unwillingness to notice the obvious than about contacts with the Russian leadership and support for Putin. Activists of the «old school» are not able to «change coordinates», to understand how the Kremlin’s policy is aggressive, and the modern Russian Federation cannot serve as a «peace-bearing» alternative to the United States or NATO. The aforementioned Blätter magazine noted: «It was only during the aggressive war with Russia that many realized how blind this pacifism was in relation to Soviet, in fact, Russian imperialism.»
What’s next?
It is not only the critics of the peace movement who speak of the deep crisis of German pacifism, even of the impasse at the present stage of its development. There is a default setting within the movement, geared toward militant anti-Americanism and a stubborn denial of any use of military force, even if it is defensive actions. There is also excessive willingness to tolerate (or at least only sluggishly condemn) the aggression of any major actor, if it is not called «America». This brings actual signals of indifference to the fate of Ukraine. The need for a different paradigm is so obvious that there are debates in leftist circles as well. The author of the article in TAZ optmicstically notes: «I am almost sure that somewhere in the ruins of the peace movement, whose analytical power was limited by the fact that the US is always to blame, a new anti-militarism is already growing, able to think with an understanding of contradictions. It must assume that in a world full of tyrants, democracies will be able to defend themselves.»
Dr. Dmitri Stratevski is political scientist and historian (FU Berlin) and director of the Eastern Europe Centre Berlin. (Osteuropa-Zentrum Berlin e.V.).
Source: The article was first published in Riddle Russia. Available under: https://ridl.io/the-pacifist-movement-in-germany-for-world-peace-or-for-friendship-with-putin/ .
Butscha - One Year After the Horror
The author, Christian Zache, visited the haunting sites of the unimaginable atrocities in Butscha and Irpin a year after they occurred and saw not only the lingering horrors, but also signs of hope for an imminent end to the war and the long-awaited arrival of peace.
Like many cities around the world, the small town of Butscha also has a cemetery. Located on the outskirts of the town, which has a population of about 35,000, this cemetery differs in certain ways from those in the larger metropolis of Kyiv, just a half-hour drive to the southeast. Butscha, along with the neighboring towns of Irpin, Hostomel, and Borodjanka to the north, witnessed countless war crimes in late February and the first half of March. These crimes were of a scale and brutality not seen in Europe since World War II, except during the civil war in the former Yugoslavia.
Russian special forces, allegedly supported by Chechen mercenaries and members of the "Wagner" mercenary group (whose involvement has not yet been conclusively determined), committed a series of massacres. In Butscha alone, around 500 people lost their lives. Entire families were wiped out; people going to work or shopping were shot in the streets, their bodies left to lie in the open for days. Relatives were denied the right to bury their dead, who were instead hastily interred in mass graves. Whole streets were reduced to rubble, cars shot up and set ablaze. Looting, rape, and torture were rampant. During the weeks-long occupation, the residents of this once-obscure small town endured a daily ordeal. Butscha has now become a sorrowful symbol of a new apocalypse.
As one turns onto the street leading to the cemetery, a sea of flowers and Ukrainian flags can be seen from afar. However, upon closer arrival, it becomes clear that this area has been transformed into a military cemetery. Indeed, in addition to the victims of the massacres, many Ukrainian soldiers from the region are buried here, soldiers who lost their lives defending their homeland. In many countries, it is customary to attach a photo of the deceased to the tombstone or cross, giving each person buried there a face, even for strangers, which is much more emotionally impactful, especially considering the cruel circumstances.
Pictures of young men, around 20 years old, who had their whole lives ahead of them, can be found here. Images in uniform, sometimes taken on the day of their enlistment, or photos capturing a happy moment, such as their first big trip, greet visitors. Young lads, perhaps experiencing their first great love, or at the beginning of a promising professional career, were torn from life from one day to the next. But also older men, often fathers, who surely did not wish for such an end for themselves, are buried here in Butscha and many other places in Ukraine.
On the way to the end of the cemetery, there was an encounter that will long remain etched in memory. The author and his Ukrainian interpreter came across a woman in her sixties. When asked if she knew where the part of the cemetery was located that housed the graves of the murdered townspeople, she looked at us with a mixture of sorrow and emptiness and simply said, 'Look back there on the left side at the end of the path, my husband is buried, and up ahead with the soldiers, my grandson.' She walked on in silence, and that sentence - which leaves one speechless - is almost impossible to surpass in terms of sheer disbelief.
Upon reaching the end of the path, the cemetery is divided into two sections. One part contains the graves of victims who were known or could be identified, while the other is filled with nameless graves in a somber row. The sheer number of fresh graves is once again enough to leave one speechless. All the graves, whether known or nameless, are adorned with flowers, a sign of dignity. Here, too, many graves display photographs of the people whose lives were ripped away by violence and terror. People of all ages, and even entire families, are buried here. One grave that will remain etched in the author's memory belongs to a 16-year-old girl who died on the same day as the author's birthday. Only the girl's family will know the exact circumstances of her death, but it serves as a stark reminder that while some celebrate their special day in peace and joy, a mere two-hour flight away (if one could fly there) people were brutally murdered in a massacre.
On the othe side of the grave field, another unsettling scene and a slight shock. Several men are digging fresh graves. In a brief conversation, they explain that almost every day, more bodies are still being found in the surrounding area or in the abandoned houses. Since they can often no longer be identified and DNA testing is too expensive and not feasible everywhere, the bodies are laid to rest in the field of the unknown. A few minutes later, a refrigerated truck converted into a hearse approach with two more coffins. In another vehicle, several locals arrive. At this point, the group with the author decides to withdraw.
In the evening, back in Kyiv. People take the metro to return home from work. Not only are the supermarkets open, but the city's restaurants and cafes are also welcoming guests, and even the opera house is open, featuring a performance of 'Madame Butterfly.' We sit in a restaurant near Maidan, among students, employees, businesspeople, and some foreigners, mostly from aid organizations, just like in many places around the world. The war suddenly feels far away again, and yet it remains so close.
The author, Christian Zache, is the 2nd Chairman of the Board and Senior Fellow of the Eastern Europe Centre Berlin (OEZB), a Berlin-based think tank. He travels to Europe's hotspots and provides authentic insights from the pulse of occurrences.
ANALYSIS
Reintegration of Donbas After the War: a Challenge for the Whole Society
By Dr. Dmitri Stratievski, Chairman of the Eastern Europe Centre Berlin (OEZB), a Berlin-based think tank.
Summary
One of the most important slogans of the Maidan protests in 2013-2014 was: "Schid i Sachid rasom!" ("East and West are together!"). This motto remains relevant. After the end of the war, the reintegration of Donbas, which has been occupied by Russia for years, and its people will become a challenge for the whole of Ukraine. However, reintegration should not only be understood as a future task for tomorrow. It must already be conceived in its full breadth today, discussed in society, decided at the governmental level, and communicated, especially to the people in the occupied territories.
Reintegration process necessary but problematic
The restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity is the declared goal of the Ukrainian government. Society also clearly supports this: in a representative survey from mid-February 2023, only 9 percent of the population were willing to make territorial concessions. In 2022, the Ukrainian armed forces liberated more than half of the areas occupied by Russia since February 2022. Images of cheering people in Kherson or Balakliya leave no doubt that peace is largely returning there without special state reintegration concepts. The situation is more complicated in large parts of Donbas – the self-proclaimed "people's republics" of Donetsk and Luhansk – which have been outside Ukrainian sovereignty for nine long years. In the context of war, Kyiv operates exclusively in military thought patterns. This logic is understandable. However, how will the coexistence of all Ukrainians in a common house work once Russian troops are completely driven out of Donbas, and the Ukrainian flag flies again over the administrative buildings in Donetsk and Luhansk?
The reintegration of an estimated 3.5 million people who have been living under Russian media, cultural, and legal influence in an unrecognized and de-facto Moscow-controlled no-man's land for almost a decade will not happen automatically. The – strategically quite understandable – motto "First victory on the battlefield, then reconciliation" hides numerous incalculable risks and problems that are difficult to repair afterward. A serious debate is therefore necessary already now but is currently hardly taking place. Ukraine needs a well-developed, multi-layered strategy that takes into account the interests of all people in Ukraine and communicates it to the citizens in the far east of the country. The development of recent years shows how difficult this will be. In October 2019, people in several Ukrainian cities protested against the law on the special status of Donbas. Alone in Kyiv, more than 10,000 people gathered on Independence Square, including volunteers from eastern Ukraine, to loudly criticize the project. Not all groups in society will welcome the measures, so intensive persuasion is necessary here.
The Ukrainian executive and legislative branches already have appropriate institutions. The preparation for reintegration can take place in the Ministry for the Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine in cooperation with the Ministry of Justice. In the Ukrainian parliament, the Committee on Human Rights, De-occupation and Re-integration of Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine, for National Minorities and Interethnic Relations is also a responsible body. The reintegration concept should include the following (integration-) political, legal, identity-creating, and economic measures.
Information policy measures
At the beginning of 2016, the authorities in the "People's Republic" of Donetsk (DNR) ordered cable providers by decree to shut down the last Ukrainian channels. Even sports, culture, and children's channels from free Ukraine were now considered "extremist." A similar approach was taken in the "People's Republic" of Luhansk (LNR). Since then, people in the occupied Donbas have had limited opportunities to receive information from the rest of Ukraine. Russian television, on the other hand, is omnipresent. In 2020, 34 channels were available via cable connection in Donetsk, 29 of them from Russia and five local ones, which do not differ in their orientation from Russian channels. The region has a relatively high number of internet connections. At least the urban population theoretically has access to Ukrainian reporting via YouTube, messenger and streaming services, including "Freedom" (a Russian-language project launched in 2022 by several Ukrainian television stations for a Russian target audience), as well as Russian-language offerings from Western media or portals of regime-critical exiled Russians.
In practice, these sources are poorly tailored to the needs of the people in Donbas. They focus on the overall war situation, and local issues and concerns from Makiivka, Chornukhyne, and Yenakiieve are not given particular attention in the current information flow. A Ukrainian state-funded channel "Voice of Donbas" on YouTube could answer many "small" questions of the people, address local issues with the help of local sympathizers, and break the Kremlin's opinion monopoly in the region, even if there will be no local representation until liberation.
Both "people's republics" function as closed entities with very limited contacts to the outside world except for Russia. However, these societies are not homogeneous. A new generation, who were children in 2014, has grown up largely isolated and has little connection to Ukraine. They know little about life before the war and have enemy images created by the education system in their minds, which are not easy to dismantle. Older people, on the other hand, remember the times when Donetsk was one of the wealthiest cities - not only in Ukraine but also in the vast Soviet Union. Despite this heterogeneity, there are dissatisfied people in every age group. They are no longer willing to accept the current situation but do not know of any alternative. A voice from free Ukraine that addresses different target groups, explains the benefits of Western rapprochement from various (mainly economic) perspectives, and conducts an honest dialogue about the future of Donbas in a united Ukraine on equal terms is urgently needed in the region. Prominent personalities who were forced to leave these parts of Ukraine after 2014 can act as locally anchored multipliers and, last but not least, convey the content of the reintegration project. While social media would be suitable for engaging younger people in the cities, a conventional shortwave radio offer would be appropriate for the older and rural population.
Clearly define the legal framework and guarantee equality
Even those in the "people's republics" who are not willing to collaborate and desire a better future associate the liberation by Ukrainian troops with tangible fears. Equal treatment in many areas such as work, education, pensions, property, trade, and retail - much remains open for the potentially affected. Although the rights of all Ukrainians are guaranteed by the constitution, an extraordinary situation requires an additional legal basis. Therefore, a law on the reintegration of Ukrainian citizens from the liberated parts of Ukraine is needed, in which the equal rights of all people from the entire country are enshrined, a wide range of social policy issues are unambiguously clarified, and any persecution or discrimination against innocent people is excluded. The draft law must become the subject of public debate in Ukraine and be supported by the majority of people on both sides of the current frontline.
A significant stumbling block on the way to implementing the reconciliation strategy in Donbas is the issue of collaboration, even if the claim of a sovereign state to prosecute collaborators and war criminals is not to be questioned. International law does not provide a clear interpretation of the term "collaboration," in contrast, for example, to the concept of "war of aggression." In this case, the legal leeway lies with national law. Only one category of suspects (doctors) enjoys special protection under humanitarian international law. In the spring of 2022, the Verkhovna Rada passed laws 5143 and 5144. They tightened Section 111.1 "Collaboration" of the Ukrainian Criminal Code and introduced the new Section 111.2 "Aiding the Aggressor State." In summary, they criminalize non-recognition of the war of aggression against Ukraine, the organization of propaganda events in favor of the occupying power, holding positions of responsibility in the service of the occupiers, and other offenses. The exercise of "smaller" bound functions in the occupation administration is punished with a professional ban for 10-15 years, with or without confiscation of personal property.
According to Ukrainian media, the government recognized some inaccuracies in the legislation in the summer of 2022. Not least because of criticism from human rights activists, a working group was formed in the Reintegration Ministry to clarify and revise the collaboration combat laws. The result is not yet known to the public. The recent investigations against collaborators in the liberated areas around Kharkiv also show a need for action. Will every clerk in the veterinary or green space office in Luhansk or every foreman of a "state" railway company in Donetsk have to fear punishment from now on? Will all school and university teachers be sanctioned - even those who have taught non-ideological subjects - or does it only affect propagandists and the executive level such as directors and rectors?
Such sensitive questions must be clarified in advance, possibly taking into account the Eastern and Central European experiences after 1990. One example of the treatment of fellow travelers of an unjust regime after a democratic change is reunified Germany, where there were only professional restrictions for certain groups of the former socialist elite. The focus was on intelligence service employees, party officials, and other people directly involved in the suppression of dissenters. Larger groups of GDR civil servants were not affected. Similar laws came into force in 1991 in the (then still) Czechoslovakia, 1993 in Latvia, 1994 in Hungary, and 1997 in Poland. Human rights organizations also reported on forced recruitment in various occupational fields in occupied Donbas. Therefore, the assessment of the individual scope of action for each person within the framework of a legally unassailable individual examination is necessary. There also needs to be a clear line regarding holders of Russian passports, who have received hundreds of thousands since 2019. In 2022, there were contradictory statements from Ukrainian politics on this issue.
Upgrading the war-torn region
For a long time, Donbas was considered the industrial heart of Ukraine. Work in mining, the chemical industry, or metal processing, whether state or privately operated, was comparatively well paid. Coal and metal were Ukrainian export hits. The miner inherited a high status symbol from the Soviet era and was the epitome of a person who, with his hard and dangerous work, made a significant contribution to strengthening the economic backbone of the country. This myth is still reflected in the everyday culture of Donbas and is more present in Donetsk and Luhansk than in the neighboring areas of Kharkiv, Dnipro, or Zaporizhzhia, which were also shaped by Soviet heavy industry. The "Donbas identity" is an indispensable part of the regional mentality and does not contradict the overall Ukrainian identity, as the special appreciation of the workers and their "performance for everyone" rather promotes the Ukrainian sense of community. At the same time, before 2014, the magnificent metropolis of Donetsk, the headquarters of several large corporations and the hometown of many political elites, served as the second center of influence in the country alongside the capital Kyiv.
Economically, the region had been struggling heavily since the collapse of the Soviet Union and had already lost much of its former glory, as many large companies were not profitable under market economy conditions. After the Orange Revolution in 2004, the portrait of the Donbas residents took on a negative color. This was especially true during Yanukovych's presidency from 2010-2014. Under the dominance of his "Party of Regions," which was indeed disproportionately strongly supported in the east of Ukraine, the "Donetsk people," a derogatory collective term, were considered democracy-hostile and Russia-affine Soviet nostalgics in parts of Ukrainian society. The outbreak of war in 2014 further exacerbated this stigmatization. More sweeping stereotypes were added. Now the conscripted men from the "people's republics" fight on the side of the Russian army. In the eyes of many Ukrainians, the occupied territory in Donbas has become a breeding ground for murderers and their accomplices. "Donetsk people" are seen as enemies. Such feelings, side effects of the war, are understandable. However, an important task of the Ukrainian state is to gradually alleviate and dismantle these prejudices against all people in Donbas. The local population in Donbas must be convinced that their achievements for all of Ukraine before 2014 have not been forgotten. In a united Ukraine, Donbas should not remain a depressive border province but regain its former glory.
Reconstruction and Economic Incentives
Reconstruction will play a central role, as no area in Ukraine has been as severely damaged by the war as Donbas, where entire cities such as Bakhmut and Mariupol have been virtually leveled by the Russian army. Housing, roads, industry, and infrastructure - everything must be rebuilt or built anew. This presents both a tremendous challenge and a historic opportunity to modernize the region and develop it as an integral part of Ukraine, becoming a new hub for the economy, science, and culture.
In this context, an honest dialogue with the people of Donbas is necessary. Many large enterprises from the past are largely unprofitable and no longer technologically and ecologically up-to-date in terms of production - simply rebuilding the destroyed facilities and factories often makes no sense. The region thus faces the threat of massive unemployment. Comprehensive training and retraining programs are needed for people who will have to adapt to the changed situation. There are parallels to the Ruhr area (industrial and mining region, severe war damage, coal crisis), which is still undergoing a comprehensive and profound structural transformation process. In Duisburg alone, about half of all employees in the coal and steel industry have lost their jobs. The major social policy problem was solved through retraining programs and new economic perspectives for the Ruhr area. Structural change is a long-term process that must be thought of in decades rather than years, but Donbas can also successfully achieve this transformation.
Economic and financial aspects play an important role in the reintegration process. War, mismanagement, and the emigration of the working-age population have impoverished the formerly prosperous areas around Donetsk and Luhansk. Corruption, crime, and arbitrary rule shape politics and the economy and hinder the development of retail, trade, and medium-sized businesses. The closure of mines and large enterprises and "restructuring" have pushed many people into unemployment, and the lack of prospects, years of fighting, and lack of security have led many to frustration and apathy.
In this extremely difficult situation, a "Reconstruction East" could offer the people of Donbas a new perspective and the prospect of improving their living standards. Of course, the people in the liberated Donbas cannot be "better off" than their compatriots from other parts of the country. However, a targeted support program for Donbas would make a significant contribution to the development of a sense of community and belonging to the Ukrainian political nation. Possible measures include grants for the renovation of damaged houses, low-interest or interest-free loans for freelancers and small businesses, simplified approval and licensing processes, and government support in job and education searches. At the moment, however, there is no talk of this. The law 7198 enacted in March on state compensation payments for private housing severely damaged or completely destroyed after February 24, 2022, due to the Russian attack explicitly excludes any benefits for owners of residential properties who were "in the temporarily occupied area at the time martial law was imposed." According to the current legal situation, people living in the parts of Donbas occupied since 2014 would not be eligible to apply for assistance after the liberation of their region.
Saving Ukrainian Culture
Cultural policy is often treated as a stepchild when it comes to designing strategic plans and is only mentioned in passing. Ukrainian culture, which has been completely pushed back and partly banned in the "people's republics" in recent years, needs comprehensive support from the Ukrainian state in the future. Donbas, formerly a cradle of Ukrainian literature and the birthplace of Mykhailo Petrenko, Volodymyr Sosiura, and Vasyl Stus, awaits its cultural renaissance. Without financial security, cultural creators will not be able to (re)establish themselves. Mere injections of money are not enough for a comeback of Ukrainian art and culture. For this, appealing examples with a high degree of effectiveness are also needed. Influential contemporary personalities from various fields such as literature, sports, music, and art, as well as internet celebrities, preferably rooted in the region, should be recruited for this purpose.
Emphasizing Reconciliation
The merging of a political Ukrainian nation, including the parts of Donbas still occupied, can only be understood as a societal task. This process is not a one-way street. It requires both great and systematic efforts from all parties and the willingness of everyone to let go of familiar clichés and entrenched notions. The Ukrainian army will pave the way for reunification. However, the military cannot win the battle for the "hearts and souls" of the people. Therefore, reconciliation must be given the highest priority.
Reintegration will be a pioneering project, as recent European history knows of no comparable endeavor. Accordingly, there is no one-size-fits-all solution. Many obstacles and challenges must be overcome. In general, the doors of the Ukrainian house are open to all people from Donbas who want to help shape the peaceful future of a democratic and independent Ukraine. Without a detailed and diverse roadmap for creating a common political, economic, and sociocultural space from Lviv to Donetsk, it will be difficult to secure lasting peace in Ukraine and establish governable power structures in Donbas that meet broad acceptance among the population.
About the Author
Dr. Dmitri Stratievski is a political scientist and historian, as well as the chairman of the Eastern Europe Centre Berlin (OEZB). He deals with the past and present of the post-Soviet space, and today’s Russia & Ukraine.
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